Book Review: The State, War, and the State of War: The State, War, and the State of War HolstiKalevi J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xiv, 254 by Krause, Keith
196 Recensions / Reviews
tions of previous volumes. But my guess is that it is time for the authors to
re-examine some of the premises of the arguments they have developed,
including the quality of the evidence on which some of their inferences about
the effects of institutions rest.
MICHAEL SMITH McGill University
The State, War, and the State of War
Kalevi J. Holsti
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xiv, 254
K. J. Holsti has followed his comprehensive 1991 work, Peace and War:
Armed Conflict and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), with another strong contribution to the causes of war
literature. But The State, War, and the State of War can be read in two ways.
The first is as a clear and compelling synthesis of recent work on "wars of the
third kind" that departs dramatically (for a mainstream International Relations
scholar) from orthodox accounts in security studies. The second is as a strong
(and somewhat unintentional) indictment of International Relations (IR) as a
myopic discipline still caught in intellectual webs spun by Cold War/great
power scholarship.
The book's central theme is that "wars of the third kind" (often called
peoples' wars, revolutionary wars, wars of national liberation) are the most
common contemporary conflicts, and that these are principally "caused" by
the "state-strength dilemma" (116). Drawing on the work of scholars such as
Barry Buzan and Mohammed Ayoob, Holsti argues that the state-making pro-
cess in the Third World has been radically different (that state-making was not
a goal of colonial policy), and that it has given rise to weak states whose ille-
gitimate governance structure (corruption-ridden, unrepresentative, exclusion-
ary, despotic and so forth) has catalyzed resistance. Unfortunately, as Holsti
points out, "many of the steps governments take to strengthen the state and to
enhance... legitimacy bring about unintended consequences that actually
undermine the coherence of the state" (183), with the result that "regions of
the world populated by weak and failing states are zones of war" (141).
The book goes on to present a spectrum of conflict—ranging from zones
of war, to no-war zones, zones of peace and pluralistic security communi-
ties—that Holsti uses to connect his theses about state weakness with the inci-
dence and nature of conflict. He also discusses in detail the anomalous case of
South America (no major war since 1941, yet major domestic conflicts),
which nicely challenges the democracy and war literature. Finally, he criti-
cally surveys the role of the United Nations (and the international community)
in dealing with wars of the third kind and concludes that perhaps it is time
both to rethink the state and the value of the Westphalian concepts that under-
pin the UN and the contemporary international order.
In the introduction and conclusion Holsti presents the moderate critique
of IR that flows from this. He argues that IR was (and remains) Euro- and
Cold War-centric. In chapter 2 he documents the progression from institution-
alized war, through total war, to the decline of interstate war and the emer-
gence of wars of the third kind, and notes that "these trends and patterns can-
not be explained by the standard theoretical devices of international politics,
particularly by neo-realist analysis" (25). He concludes with a call for the
comparative study of "how states are formed, how they develop legitimacy
and strength, and how they persist or fail" (207).
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It is hard not to push these points to a stronger critique, yet Holsti backs
away from this. For example, he maintains that Rousseau's realist "stag hunt"
metaphor "is a powerful theoretical explanation for the peristence of wars
between states" (9). But if one takes the central role of state formation seri-
ously, the same dynamic of internal and external "causes of war" has been at
work throughout the several centuries of European state formation, even if
Third World and European processes of state formation followed different tra-
jectories. Such is the thrust of comparativists such as Charles Tilly (who Holsti
cites with approval). Likewise, he treats political economy approaches to con-
temporary conflicts in five pages (with two references, both pre-dating 1974)
and dismisses recent political economy literature on "the articulation of social
and political power in state formation" as "only tangentially related to the
phenomenon of wars of the third kind" (139-40). But if a "comprehensive
analysis must. . . acknowledge the complex interweaving of domestic and
external factors" (129) and if "the place to pursue explanations is not in the
character of relations between states, but in the character of the states them-
selves" (26), then political economy analyses of domestic social formations
are absolutely crucial.
Finally, when Holsti notes that "the war in ex-Yugoslavia brought to aca-
demic consciousness the factor of ethnicity in international relations" (123),
he seems to forget that major work by scholars such as Ted Robert Gurr and
Donald Horowitz well predate this conflict. They were, however, treated as
marginal to the central concerns of East-West strategic studies, and dismissed
as "comparative politics not IR" by many. The problem was not lack of aca-
demic consciousness, but the construction of International Relations and stra-
tegic studies so as to exclude any analysis of what went on inside the state.
Overall, the book provides a nice bridge between "old realism" and new
currents of thinking about war and peace. One must also admire the (rare)
willingness of senior scholars such as Holsti, who have set the tone for genera-
tions of IR teaching and have persistently argued for the durability of realist
accounts, to jettison their verities. One hopes that the doors he opens, but does
not walk through, will be traversed by others.
KEITH KRAUSE Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations
Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, eds.
East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996, pp. viii, 429
Despite the fact that the conduct of world politics has always depended on rhe-
torical skill, rhetoric—that is, the "forms and effects of conversations,
speeches, debates, narratives, or discourses in political practice" (1)—has tra-
ditionally received little attention. Remedying this neglect is the objective of
the thought-provoking volume at hand. In order to engage the theme of dis-
course in international relations, moreover, the book's contributors are forced
to confront the hegemony of the dominant discourse within the discipline of
International Relations (IR)—that of realism. They do this through a critical
and creative rereading of key realist figures, including Kissinger, Kennan,
Carr, Wight and Morgenthau, and through an equally critical and creative re-
thinking of key realist concepts, including sovereignty, security, prestige,
nationalism, foreign policy and strategy (often with the aid of decidedly non-
realist frameworks such as gender and genealogy).
Among the most noteworthy of the contributions to the book is Roger
Epp's stimulating treatment of the work of the British realist, Martin Wight.
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